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Abstract. In this paper we explore the trade-off between security and
performance in considering a model of a key distribution centre. The
model is specified using the Markovian process algebra PEPA. The ba-
sic model suffers from the commonly encountered state space explo-
sion problem, and so we apply some approximate techniques to solve
it. First, model reduction techniques and approximation to give a form
of the model(in fact, a closed queueing network model) which is more
scalable. The approximated model is analysed numerically and results
derived from the approximation are compared with a discrete event sim-
ulation. We, then, consider the use of a fluid flow approximation based
on ordinary differential equations (ODEs) derived from a form of sim-
plified model. The results derived from solving the ODEs are compared
with previous closed queueing network approximation. Those results have
been found are the same as the asymptotic bounds solution for the queue-
ing network approximation which demonstrates that ODEs gives a al-
ternative solvent of asymptotic bounds, only having been proved, in this
circumstance. Base on those techniques above, we, finally, evaluate a
cost function of this secure key exchange model. Three questions have
been proposed; how many clients can a given KDC configure support?
how much service capacity must we provide at a KDC to satisfy a given
number of clients? and what is the maximum rate at which keys can be
refreshed before the KDC performance begins to degrade in a given de-
mand on a given system? Answers of these three questions are illustrated
through numerical examples.
1 Introduction
One of the more intriguing areas of performance engineering to emerge over
recent years has been the study of the overhead introduced by making a system
secure. It is clear that in order to add more functionality to a system that more
execution time is required. However, in the case of security, the benefit accrued
from any additional overhead is not easy to quantify and so it is very hard for
the performance engineer to argue that a particular performance target should
take precedence over a security goal. One area where alternative secure solutions
exist is in cryptography, where there may be a choice of algorithm, or even a
choice of key length, which will greatly influence the performance of the system.
For this reason cryptographic protocols are one of the few areas of security to
have received much attention from the performance community [1–3]. To date
this work has been largely limited to measurement and has not addressed the
underlying causes of delay which might be understood by modelling or detailed
code analysis.
In this paper we tackle a different, but related, problem in the area of the
performance - security trade-off, namely key exchange. Our initial inspiration
for this work has been the study of the wide mouth frog protocol by Buchholz et
al [4]. The authors used the stochastic process algebra PEPA to analyse timing
properties of the protocol. Although their motivation was to investigate timing
attacks, the models developed in [4] showed how authentication protocols can
be modelled effectively in PEPA. In our previous work [5], three bisimilarity
models have been modelled and analyzed numerically, but encountered state
space explosion problem. The main assignment of this paper is exploring possible
approaches to solve the problem and evaluating a cost function, base on those
techniques, to better understand the behaviour of this system.
The paper is organised as follows. In the next section we introduce the system
to be modelled, the key distribution centre (KDC). This is followed by a brief
overview of the Markovian process algebra PEPA. Section 4 introduces the basic
model of the KDC, followed by a simplified (equivalent) version and an approx-
imation in Section 5. Some numerical results of approximation are presented in
Section 6, including comparison of the approximation results with simulation.
After that, OED analysis has been introduced in section 7, and section 8 shows
its numerical results which compared with approximation and stochastic simula-
tion. The cost model and its numerical results analysis are illustrated in section 9
and 10 respectively. Finally we draw some conclusions and discuss some avenues
for future research.
2 Key Distribution Centre
We now describe the specific problem we seek to model. This is the secure
exchange of secret keys (also known as symmetric keys) using a trusted third
party known as a key distribution centre (KDC). The protocol is illustrated
below, following the description in [6].
– Alice and KDC share a key KA
– Bob and KDC share a key KB
1. Alice sends request to KDC with nonce N1
2. E{KA} [KS |request|N1|E {KB} [KS |IDA]]
- KS is a session key for Alice and Bob to use.
- Alice can’t decrypt the part encoded with Bob’s key, she can only send it
on.
3. E{KB} [KS |IDA]
4. E{KS} [N2]
5. E{KS} [f(N2)]
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Fig. 1. Key Distribution Scenario.
where,
– N1 and N2 are nonces (random items of data),
– IDA is a unique identifier for Alice,
– E{KA}[X] denotes that the data X is encrypted using the key KA, and
– f(N2) denotes a predefined function applied to the nonce N2, signifying that
Alice has read the encrypted message sent by Bob.
The key features of this protocol are that only Alice can read the message
sent by the KDC (2) as only Alice and the KDC know the key KA. Included
in this message is another message further encrypted with KB , the key shared
by Bob and the KDC. Alice cannot read this message, but instead forwards it
to Bob (3). This message tells Bob that Alice is genuine (i.e. has communicated
with the KDC and displays a correct ID) and informs Bob of the session key;
only Bob can read this message. Alice and Bob now both know the session key
KS and the remainder of the protocol ensures that Bob trusts Alice and the
session key (and Alice trusts Bob).
3 PEPA
In this paper we model the performance of the key distribution centre using
the Markovian process algebra PEPA. This approach has a number of advan-
tages over a direct approach of using Markov chains. As a formal specification,
a PEPA model can be derived automatically from, and compared automatically
with, formal definitions of the protocol we are modelling. Functional properties
of the model, such as deadlock freeness, can also be checked automatically. These
attributes of the model specification are particularly important in the field of
security, where correctness is vital if security properties are to be maintained.
Furthermore, the analysis of the model we are considering here is based on formu-
lating progressive simplified versions of the model. Because of the formal nature
of the specification we can apply formal transformations to the model based on
known concepts of equivalence. Therefore we know that the approximate model
we derive shares certain properties with the original model. In brief, we know,
and can prove, that the approximation is still a valid model of the original pro-
tocol. This would not be possible if we simply chose the approximation by some
expert intuition or arrived at it by some less formal means.
A formal presentation of PEPA is given in [7], in this section a brief informal
summary is presented. PEPA, being a Markovian Process Algebra, only sup-
ports actions that occur with rates that are negative exponentially distributed.
Specifications written in PEPA represent Markov processes and can be mapped
to a continuous time Markov chain (CTMC). Systems are specified in PEPA in
terms of activities and components. An activity (α, r) is described by the type of
the activity, α, and the rate of the associated negative exponential distribution,
r. This rate may be any positive real number, or given as unspecified using the
symbol >.
The syntax for describing components is given as:
(α, r).P | P +Q | P/L | P BCL Q | A
The component (α, r).P performs the activity of type α at rate r and then
behaves like P . The component P + Q behaves either like P or like Q, the
resultant behaviour being given by the first activity to complete.
The component P/L behaves exactly like P except that the activities in the
set L are concealed, their type is not visible and instead appears as the unknown
type τ .
Concurrent components can be synchronised, P BCL Q, such that activities in
the cooperation set L involve the participation of both components. In PEPA
the shared activity occurs at the slowest of the rates of the participants and
if a rate is unspecified in a component, the component is passive with respect
to activities of that type. A def= P gives the constant A the behaviour of the
component P .
In this paper we consider only models which are cyclic, that is, every deriva-
tive of components P and Q are reachable in the model description P BCL Q.
Necessary conditions for a cyclic model may be defined on the component and
model definitions without recourse to the entire state space of the model.
4 The Models
This scheme can be easily modelled for a single pair of clients in PEPA [7] as
follows (Model 1).
KDC
def= (request,>).(response, rp).KDC
Alice
def= (request, rq).(response,>).Alice′
Alice′ def= (sendBob, rB).(sendAlice,>).(confirm, rc).Alice′′
Alice′′ def= (usekey, ru).Alice
Bob
def= (sendBob,>).(sendAlice, rA).(confirm,>).Bob′
Bob′ def= (usekey,>).Bob
System
def= KDC BCL AliceBCK Bob
Where, L = {request, response}, K = {sendBob, sendAlice, confirm, usekey}.
In Model 1, above, Alice’s behaviour is separated into getting a session key
(Alice), authentication with Bob (Alice′) and using the session key (Alice′′).
Similarly Bob’s behaviour is separated into the key exchange and authentication
with Alice (Bob) and the use of the session key (Bob′). In this model Alice only
requests (and uses) one session key at a time. Thus the model is limited such
that if Alice wishes to start a new session, she must first finish the previous ses-
sion. This observation will be important when considering models with multiple
clients.
According to Stallings [6]:
“The more frequently session keys are exchanged, the more secure they
are, because the opponent has less cipher text to work with for any given
session key. On the other hand, the distribution of session keys delays
the start of any exchange and places a burden on network capacity. A
security manager must try to balance these competing considerations in
determining the lifetime of a particular session key.”
In brief, this means there is a trade-off to be achieved between performance and
security in the handling of session keys. In our model (above), this would be
represented by varying the values of ru and rq. If these values are high then keys
are being refreshed more regularly, putting more demand on the KDC and the
network.
In our work we are primarily interested in studying the performance of the
KDC, rather than the network. In [5] we developed three approaches to mod-
elling multiple clients requesting session keys from the KDC. These approaches
all formally represent the same protocol definition and are notionally equivalent
at the syntactic level (they have a form of bisimilarity). However, they are not
isomorphic and hence can give different values for important performance met-
rics. In the most intuitive version, presented in this paper, multiple clients are
manually added using different names with parallel requests and responses al-
lowed; meaning that the KDC can receive (and queue) several distinct requests
before responding to them. A model with N pairs of clients is illustrated in
Figure 2.
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Fig. 2. Diagrammatic representation of a key distribution centre.
This approach can be modelled in PEPA as follows (Model 2).
KDC
def= (request1,>).KDC1 + (request2,>).KDC2
+ · · ·+ (requestN ,>).KDCN
KDC1
def= (response1, rp).KDC + (request2,>).KDCN+1
+ · · ·+ (requestN ,>).KDC2N−1
· · ·
KDC2N
def= (response1, rp/N).KDC2N−N + (response2, rp/N).KDC2N−N+1
+ · · ·+ (responseN , rp/N).KDC2N−1
Alicei
def= (requesti, rq).(responsei,>).(sendBi, rB).(sendAi,>).
(confirmi, rc).(usekeyi, ru).Alicei , 1 ≤ i ≤ N
Bobi
def= (sendBi,>).(sendAi, rA).(confirmi,>).(usekeyi,>).Bobi
, 1 ≤ i ≤ N
System
def= KDC BCK ((Alice1 BCL1 Bob1)|| · · · ||(AliceN BCLN BobN )
Where,
K = {request1, response1, · · · , requestN , responseN}
and
Li = {sendBi, sendAi, confirmi, usekeyi}
In Model 2 we introduce the possibility that the KDC is serving multiple
requests from multiple Alices. Each Alice still only makes one request at a time
and each request is served by the KDC (we are not overly concerned here about
the order of service). Note that due to the semantics of the specification events
occur sequentially and not simultaneously. In addition we do not allow batched
requests.
Specific notation in Model 2 is introduced as follows. The subscript j in
KDCj corresponds to a binary representation of the request status of node i,
such that the ith bit is 1 if Alicei is awaiting a response from the KDC and
0 otherwise. The rate of each responsei action in KDCj is rp divided by the
number of responsei’s enabled.
It is worth observing here that Model 2 is cumbersome to specify; if we want
to consider an extra client that no only needs to be specified as new Alicej
and Bobj components, but also the KDC component needs to be modified to
incorporate the additional behaviours, requestj and responsej .
5 Model Simplification and Approximation
Model 2 suffers from the commonly encountered state space explosion problem.
For each Alice (and corresponding Bob) the state space is multiplied by another
6 behaviours, hence the state space is 6N , where N is the number of client
pairs (Alice+Bob). With N = 9 the state space has already grown to over 1
million states; if N is only 5, the solution still involves matrices with over 60
million elements (although admittedly mostly zeros). Even the best distributed
Markov chain solvers generally only tackle state spaces of a few million states at
most. To counter this, and to make the model easier to specify and understand,
we have applied some simplification techniques to derive a form of the model
which gives the same results for key steady state metrics. This approach is based
on the concept known as bisimulation; whereby two models may be said to
be equivalent if any sequence of actions that is possible in one model, has an
equivalent sequence of actions (at the same rate) in the other model (strong
bisimulation requires that equivalent actions have the same name, which is not
the case here). This leads us to an alternative representation of the model as
follows (Model 3).
KDC
def= (request,>).KDC + (response, rp).KDC
Alice
def= (request, rq).(response,>).Alice′
Alice′ def= (sendBob, rB).(sendAlice,>).(confirm, rc).Alice′′
Alice′′ def= (usekey, ru).Alice
Bob
def= (sendBob,>).(sendAlice, rA).(confirm,>).Bob′
Bob′ def= (usekey,>).Bob
System
def= KDC BCL
(
AliceBCK Bob|| . . . ||AliceBCK Bob
)
Where, L = {request, response}, K = {sendBob, sendAlice, confirm, usekey}.
Clearly the component Bob is almost redundant, and the sharing for the
action request and its enabling in KDC has no effect on the behaviour of the
model. Hence an even simpler equivalent specification would be (Model 4):
KDC
def= (response, rp).KDC
Alice
def= (request, rq).(response,>).Alice′
Alice′ def= (sendBob, rB).(sendAlice, rA).(confirm, rc).Alice′′
Alice′′ def= (usekey, ru).Alice
System
def= KDC BC
response
(Alice|| . . . ||Alice)
This model and the preceding one are clearly isomorphic, i.e. they have equiv-
alent CTMCs with a one-to-one mapping between states and transitions. We can
now apply the well known approximation technique of combining successive in-
ternal actions into a single action with a modified rate. This is equivalent to
lumping states in the underlying Markov chain (Hillston [7] introduced the weak
isomorphism equivalence for exactly this purpose). Thus we obtain the following
simple form of the model (Model 5).
KDC
def= (response, rp).KDC
Alice
def= (response,>).(τ, rx).Alice
System
def= KDC BC
response
(Alice|| . . . ||Alice)
Where rx is given by
rx =
(
1
rq
+
1
rB
+
1
rA
+
1
rc
+
1
ru
)−1
Model 5 is equivalent to a simple closed queueing system with one queueing
station (the KDC) and an exponential delay after service before returning to
the queue. It is a simple matter to write down the balance equations for such a
system.
rpΠi = (N + 1− i)rxΠi−1 , 1 ≤ i ≤ N
where Πi is the steady state probability that there are exactly i jobs waiting for
a response from the KDC and N is the number of pairs of clients (the number
of instances of Alice in the above PEPA model specification). Thus it is possible
to derive expressions for the average utilisation of the KDC and the average
number of requests waiting for a response.
U = 1−
[
N !
N∑
i=0
ρi
(N − i)!
]−1
and,
L = N !(1− U)
N∑
i=1
ρii
(N − i)!
where ρ = rx/rp.
This approximation is, in fact, an M/M/1/./N queue and the throughput
and average response time are easily computed from the above expressions (see
Mitrani [8] pages 195-197).
T = (N − L)rx
and
W =
N
T
− 1
rx
6 Numerical Results of Approximation
The approximation is now compared with simulation results for the full model.
The simulation was written in Java using the roulette wheel approach. The sim-
ulation has been verified numerically against the PEPA model using the PEPA
Workbench [9] for small numbers of clients (N ≤ 6). The PEPA Workbench will
not give results for larger models due to problems with performing computa-
tions on the large matrices involved, hence the need for the simulation. Initially
in the experiments which follow, the parameters are set to 1.0 (except ru=1.1 for
numerical computation reasons in the PEPA Workbench) and other parameters
are varied as shown.
In Figure 3 we show the utilisation (of the KDC) varied against the num-
bers of client pairs for both the simulation and the approximation for various
values of rp. Increasing the value of rp in this way is equivalent to replacing the
KDC with a faster server. In Figure 4 we show the average response time (av-
erage waiting time plus average service time) of the KDC for the same systems.
Clearly, for both metrics, there is a very close match between the simulation and
the approximation. Hence, in Figures 5 and 6, we show the percentage error,
given as (approximation-simulation)/simulation, for both metrics to provide a
greater insight into the accuracy of the approximation. This shows that the ap-
proximation and simulation agree to within 2% for the utilisation and within
4% for average response time. In all cases the simulation is run to a terminating
condition of a 95% confidence interval. Not surprisingly this becomes increas-
ingly more difficult to attain as N increases, hence the run-time increases with
N .
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The most significant difference between the simulation and the approximation
is the time it takes to derive results. The simulation took several weeks to code
and each run takes in excess of 10 hours (we are not claiming this to be the
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Fig. 5. Relative error in utilisation of approximation compared to simulation. ru = 1.1,
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most efficient simulation possible) whereas the approximation was coded into
MS Excel in less than half an hour and results are almost instantaneous. It
is worth noting that these metrics are based on long run averages, which we
would expect the approximation to be fairly accurate in predicting, particularly
utilisation. If the measure of interest was a transient measure then the lumping
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Fig. 6. Relative error in average response time of approximation compared to simula-
tion. ru = 1.1, rA = rB = rc = rq = 1.
of states might not give such an accurate picture. Furthermore, if we wished to
predict the end to end performance of the protocol, i.e. from request to confirm,
then we would need to perform a slightly different approximation which separates
the usekey action from the other lumped actions.
The results show that there is obviously a benefit from increasing the server
speed at the KDC, but the increase in server speed is not necessarily exactly
proportional to the increase in capacity. For example, if we have a target max-
imum utilisation of 0.65, then with rp = 1 the KDC can cope with at most
4 client pairs. If we increase the server rate to rp = 3 then the capacity is 10
client pairs, not 12 as we might intuitively expect. However, if we specify the
maximum average response time to be 2, then rp = 1 gives the capacity as 4,
rp = 2 gives 12, and rp = 3 gives the capacity as 18 client pairs. Clearly in
this case the increase in server speed from rp = 1 to rp = 2, or rp = 3, has a
significantly greater impact on the client capacity than we might expect. Note
also that, whilst intuitively we may consider that it is possible that a greater
impact could be made by considering multiple KDC severs, we know that for
a simple M/M/k queue it is preferable to have one fast server than two of half
the speed. Clearly therefore we would rather double the speed of the processor,
than double the number of processors at the KDC (although doing both would
clearly be beneficial).
In the above experiments the duration for which the session key is used is
set to be approximately the same as the durations for any other action. We have
done this so that we can explore the behaviour of the KDC when it is heavily
loaded, despite only having a small number of client pairs. Clearly this is not
a practical scenario and having established the accuracy of the approximation
we can now go on to consider larger systems with a greater duration of the use
of the session key. Note that although in theory the approximation scales very
well, in practise there can be numerical problems relating to the representation
and manipulation of large factorials, hence in this instance we have restricted
the experimentation to N = 150 (150! ≈ 5.7 ∗ 10262)
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Figures 7 and 8 show the utilisation and average response time for various
values of ru and rp when N = 150. When the use rate is low (ru = 0.01)
the performance is good for rp > 2 (in fact the response time for rp = 2 is
more than five times that of rp = 5, although this is not clear in the graph).
However, increasing the use rate has a dramatic effect on both the utilisation
and the average response time. The systems rapidly become saturated, except
rp = 5 (and to a lesser extent rp = 4) which grows more gently. At ru = 0.05
all the systems are saturated (100% utilisation). A similar picture is evident
for the average response time. For rp = 5 the average response time increases
exponentially. However, for rp = 1, where the response time is obviously much
greater, the increase is inversely exponential, i.e. the rate of increase decreases
as ru increases. This is because rp = 1 is already saturated at ru = 0.01 and so
a large number of clients are already spending a long time in the queue awaiting
a response from the KDC. Hence, decreasing the time they use the session key
does not greatly change their overall behaviour (which is already dominated by
queueing). The other cases of 1 < ru < 5 fall between these extremes, with the
saturation point being clearly evident in the plot of the average response time.
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7 ODE analysis
Thus far we have considered a traditional approach to modelling and analysis.
The approximation shows good accurarcy of prediction compared with a dis-
crete event simulation, scales well and is fast to compute. Nevertheless, it is
frustrated by large factorial computation. In this section we consider an alter-
native approach proposed by Hillston [10], based on the solution of ordinary
differential equations (ODEs). In this style of model analysis, the model is ex-
pressed as a number of replicated components and the ODEs represent the flow
between behaviours (PEPA derivatives) of the components. Thus, by solving the
ODEs, it is possible to ‘count’ the number of components behaving as a given
derivative at any given time, t. In the absence of oscillations, the limit, t −→∞,
then gives a steady state value.
It is important to make two crucial observations about this approach. Firstly,
this is a fluid approximation, not discrete behaviour. Therefore, we observe a
continuous evolution of a derivative, so we can, at any given time, see a fraction
of an Alice behaving in some way, and another fraction behaving in another.
Secondly the analysis is deterministic. Thus, not only will simulating such a
system produce exactly the same results every time, but also if the rate of an
action is r, then a component will have completely evolved (or flowed) into its
derivative in exactly 1/r time units.
Rewriting our model, removing redundancy and naming each derivative of
Alice (for clarity) we get:
KDC
def= (response, rp).KDC
Alice
def= (request, rq).Alice1
Alice1
def= (response, rp).Alice2
Alice2
def= (sendBob, rB).Alice3
Alice3
def= (sendAlice, rA).Alice4
Alice4
def= (confirm, rc).Alice5
Alice5
def= (usekey, ru).Alice
The system is then defined as:
KDC[K] BC
response
Alice[N ]
Where, K is the number of KDC’s (hitherto K = 1) and N is the number of
client pairs (Alices’s). It is then a simple matter to write down the ODEs for
this system as follows.
d
dt
Alice = ruAlice5(t)− rqAlice(t)
d
dt
Alice1 = rqAlice(t)− rpmin(KDC(t), Alice1(t))
d
dt
Alice2 = rpmin(KDC(t), Alice1(t))− rBAlice2(t)
d
dt
Alice3 = rBAlice2(t)− rAAlice3(t)
d
dt
Alice4 = rAAlice3(t)− rcAlice4(t)
d
dt
Alice5 = rcAlice4(t)− ruAlice5(t)
d
dt
KDC = 0
There are a number of approaches to solving this set of ODEs. For simplicity
we have simulated over a suitably long time frame until we observe the long run
(steady state) behaviour. In doing so we need to be careful that in discretizing
time we make the time step sufficiently small so as to not alter the system
behaviour. Typically we take the time step, δt, such that, δt ≤ 1/(rmaxN),
where rmax = max(rq, rp, rB , rA, rc, ru).
In our analysis we are interested primarily in the number of client pairs await-
ing a response from the KDC (or KDC’s). This is represented in the model by
the number of Alice1’s; L(N) = Alice1(t −→ ∞) when there are N client pairs
(Alice’s) in the population. From this we can derive the average response time
which can be compared with that derived from the queueing network approxi-
mation. We compute the average response time for a system of N client pairs
and one KDC server (K = 1), W(N), as follows;
W (N) =
L(N − 1) + 1
rp
This computation is based on the queueing theory result of an arrival as random
observer, see Mitrani [8] page 141 for example. For K > 1 the computation is
only slightly more complex. If the random observer sees a free server, then the
average response time will be the average service time. However, if the random
observer sees all the servers busy, then the average response time will be the
average service time plus the time it takes for one server to become available
(including scheduling the other jobs waiting ahead of the random observer).
W (N) =
1
rp
, L(N − 1) + 1 ≤ K
W (N) =
1
rp
+
L(N − 1) + 1−K
Krp
=
L(N − 1) + 1
Krp
, L(N − 1) + 1 > K
It is a feature of the fluid flow approximation that (for t > 0) the KDC will
never be idle, but instead will always have some fluid flowing through it. As such
we are unable to compute the utilisation of the KDC directly. This is clearly a
limitation of this form of analysis.
8 Numerical results of ODEs
Figure 9 shows the evolution over time of the number of clients awaiting a
response as derived from the ODE analysis. Initially all the clients are behaving
as Alice, hence Alice1(0) = 0. Shortly after the start there is a large influx of
fluid into Alice1 before the system settles into a stable flow. Interestingly this
initial surge is much more pronounced when rp = 4 than rp = 1. This is clearly
due to the fact that the flow out of Alice1 is much greater when rp = 4.
Figure 10 shows the average response time calculated by the ODE method,
compared with the queueing approximation described earlier. This approxima-
tion has previously been compared with simulation and shown to be accurate to
within the 95% confidence interval of the simulation in section 6.
We expect the ODE method to be accurate when N is large. Figure 10
shows that it is possible to generate accurate results even when N is quite small.
However, there is a clear difference between the two methods where the gradient
changes. This is shown more explicitly in Figure 11, where the evolution of
the ODEs is compared with the stochastic simulation of the PEPA model [11]
derived directly using the PEPA Eclipse Plug-in. When N is sufficiently far
from the gradient change there is good agreement between the ODE solution
and the stochastic simulation. However, at N = 6 the divergence is significant;
the stochastic simulation never achieves the lower queue length predicted by the
ODEs.
It is of clear practical importance to be able to predict the divergence. This
point, N∗, can be estimated using the method of asymptotic bounds of closed
queueing networks (see Haverkort [12] pages 245-246 for example).
N∗ = K +
Krp
rx
= K +Krp
(
1
rq
+
1
rB
+
1
rA
+
1
rc
+
1
ru
)
(1)
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Below N∗ the asymptotic bound is given as
L(N) =
Nrx
rx + rp
(2)
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Fig. 11. Number of waiting clients over time, rp = rq = rB = rA = rc = 1 and ru = 1.1
Above N∗ the asymptotic bound is given as
L(N) =
Nrx −Krp
rx
(3)
These bounds can also easily be found by solving the ODEs analytically in
the limit t −→ ∞, where the min(KDC(t), Alice1(t)) term is replaced with
Alice1(t) and KDC(t) respectively. Thus, in this instance at least, the ODE
solution is giving an alternative means for calculating known asymptotic results
for closed queueing networks. Note that W (N) is computed from L(N − 1), and
so in Figure 10, the divergence occurs at approximately 6.91 (rp = 1), 11.82
(rp = 2) and 21.64 (rp = 4), i.e. N∗ + 1.
We have also compared the two methods for larger values of N and have
found there to be almost no difference for N > 40 for the parameters used
here. It is important to note that there are numerical issues with computing the
queueing approximation due to the difficulty of handling large factorials (and
their reciprocals) and these problems do not occur with the ODE solutions or
asymptotic results. Thus, as long as we avoid the region around N∗, the ODE
solution is giving accurate results without problems with scalability.
8.1 Multiple KDC servers
We now turn our attention to the consideration of multiple servers at the KDC.
In particular we would wish to know if it is more beneficial to increase the
number of servers or increase the speed of the server. It is well known that for
an M/M/K queue, it is preferable to have 1 server serving at rate µ than K
servers serving at rate µ/K. This is because if there are less than K jobs in
the queue then some of the K servers will be idle, thus reducing the overall
service rate. In the ODEs above this is evident in rpmin(KDC(t), Alice1(t)). If
Alice1(t) > K then all K servers are in use and the flow rate from the KDC
would be Krp. However, if Alice1(t) < K then fewer servers would be in use and
the rate would be rpAlice1(t).
There is a multi-clients issue in PEPA model should be specified here. We
can easily increase the number of servers at the KDC in the PEPA specification.
System
def= (KDC|| . . . ||KDC) BC
response
(Alice|| . . . ||Alice)
However, we must give the response action in Alice the rate rp, rather than
being passive.
Alice
def= (response, rp).(τ, rx).Alice
This is because a passive action would be subject to the apparent rate in PEPA.
Hence, K KDCs and 1 Alice would give rise to response occuring at rate Krp;
whereas if the rate is rp in both KDC and Alice, then this problem does not
arise.
Thus the approximation becomes an M/M/K/./N queue, where K is the
number of instances of the KDC component (i.e. servers at the KDC). Hence
the balance equations become,
(N − i)rxΠi = (i+ 1)rpΠi+1 , 0 ≤ i < K
(N − i)rxΠi = KrpΠi+1 ,K ≤ i < N
Thus we can calculate Π0
Π0 =
[
N !
K−1∑
i=0
ρi
(N − i)!i! +N !
N∑
i=K
ρi
(N − i)!K!Ki−K
]−1
The average queue length can be then calculated by
 L = N !Π0
[
K−1∑
i=1
ρii
(N − i)!i! +
N∑
i=K
ρii
(N − i)!K!Ki−K
]
The average response time and throughput can then be computed as before.
Figure 12 shows the proportion of Alices waiting at the KDC (i.e. L(N)/N)
for K = 1 with rp = 4 and K = 4 with rp = 1 for both the queue approximation
and the ODE solution. When N is large (in this case N ≥ 25) the ODE values
are the same, however for smaller N the single faster server is seen to perform
better (for the reason discussed above). The reason the ODE values are identical
for large N is simply that the fluid level of Alices waiting at the KDC will
never fall below K in the ODE solution. The values for the QN approximation
differ slightly from each other, even when N = 40. This is because even at this
load there is still the chance that the queue will fall below 4 requests for short
periods. Clearly, as N increases the probability that this happens will become
increasingly insignificant and hence the values will converge.
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There is a clear divergence between the ODE and QN results around the
change in gradient as we have already observed in Figure 10. Figure 13 shows
this in more detail for the average queue size. Note that although the two ODE
solutions converge at N = 25, there is still a significant difference with the QN
solutions at this point, near to N∗.
9 The cost model
We now wish to explore the question of capacity planning for a system involving
a key distribution centre based on those techniques which introduced above.
In doing this there are two closely related questions we wish to address. How
many clients can a given KDC configuration support? and how much service
capacity must we provide at a KDC to satisfy a given number of clients. In the
first instance we would fix K and rp and find the largest value of N before the
performance begins to significantly degrade. In the latter case we would fix N
and rp and find an optimal value of K. In addition to these two cases, we may also
ask, given a demand (from N client pairs with use rate ru and request rate rq)
on a given system (of K servers running at rate rp), what is the maximum rate
at which keys can be refreshed before the KDC performance begins to degrade?
In answering these questions we need to consider what we mean by the per-
formance of the KDC. We have introduced a number of performance measures
already, including utilisation, throughput, average queue length and average re-
sponse time. All of these measures are important, but considering all of them at
once will not lead to a clear picture of optimal performance. Instead we intro-
duce a cost function to be optimised. This function is based on the assumption
that there is a cost in keeping customers waiting (the longer they wait, the less
they will be satisfied) and a competing cost in providing resources at the KDC
(e.g. purchasing and maintaining or leasing servers).
This gives rise to the following simple cost function.
C = c1L+ c2Krp , c1, c2 ≥ 0 (4)
The cost rates c1 and c2 are dependent on the particular system in question
and may further depend on the type of quality of service contract that is in
place with customers. If we wish to improve the responsiveness of the system,
we would increase c1, whereas if we want to minimise running costs we would
increase c2.
Taking the asymptotic results (2) and (3) for L gives a simple exposition of
this cost function. If N < N∗ then
C =
c1Nrx
rx + rp
+ c2Krp (5)
This function is always increasing with K. If N > N∗ then
C = c1
Nrx −Krp
rx
+ c2Krp (6)
If we seek to find the largest value of N before the performance begins to
significantly degrade, then (5) and (6) will increase linearly with N (as all other
parameters are fixed). Clearly, the rate of cost increase after N∗ will always be
greater than the rate below N∗. Thus, N∗ represents the point at which the
cost begins to grow significantly, especially if rp is large. Similarly, if we seek
to minimise C with respect to K for a given N then c1Nrx is fixed and so 6 is
increasing with K if c1 < rxc2.
Now, recall that (1) gives
N∗ = K
(
rx + rp
rx
)
So, for small K, N∗ will also be small and as K increases, so will N∗. If N is
fixed, then we can define K∗ such that:
K∗ = N
(
rx
rx + rp
)
Clearly, if K < K∗ then N > N∗ and if K > K∗ then N < N∗. Thus, (5)
and (6) predict the optimal value of K to be Kopt = 1 if c1 < rxc2 and Kopt =
INT (K∗ + 0.5) if c1 > rxc2 However, as these asymptotic results will always
underestimate L in the region around N∗ the relationship is more accurately
described as Kopt = 1 if c1 ≤ rxc2 and Kopt ≈ K∗ if c1 > rxc2.
10 Numerical results of Cost Model
We now illustrate the scenarios described above through numerical examples.
Figures 14 and 15 show the cost varied against the number of clients, calcu-
lated by queueing network model equations and asymptotic bounds respectively.
Clearly, under these parameter values with rp = 1, the cost raises rapidly at
around 80 clients, which is the approximate maximum capability that the KDC
can handle before performance starts to degrade. In a small system (N < 60),
the cost is greater for a faster KDC. The reason for this is that some servers will
be idle when the queue size is small enough, and so the system is not making effi-
cient use of computational resources. In the cases rp = 2, 3 and 4, when N = 120
clients the exact computation of C using the queueing network model becomes
costly, and so we adopt the use of the asymptotic bound. Figure 15 shows that
the maximum number of clients which can be supported by the KDC in case of
rp = 2, 3 and 4 are around 210, 310 and 410, respectively. Thus, doubling the
service rate from rp = 2 to rp = 4 effectively doubles the capacity of the system
in this case.
We now start to seek the optimal value of K to minimize the cost of system.
According to the analysis in last section, Kopt always equals 1 when c1 ≤ rxc2.
Hence, investigation of Kopt when c1 > rxc2 is more interesting and valuable.
We employ the asymptotic bound as the more efficient approach in optimisation,
because we wish to explore larger population sizes (N = 500, 1000, 2000 clients).
In addition, we consider the running cost c2 to be either 1/10 or 10, to explore
the case where we are more interested in minimising running costs or queue
length (hence response time).
Figure 16 shows the results of cost varied with number of KDCs. Generally,
more clients need more KDCs to support them, in order to reduce the optimal
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cost. In each of the three cases (N = 500, N = 1000 and N = 2000 clients), the
larger c2 results in a decreasing cost before the optimal point and an increasing
rate after that. For any given number of clients, the optimal value of K in Figure
14 is shown to be independent of c2. Kopt =5, 10, 20 for N = 500, 1000, 2000
although results from asymptotic solution are not entirely accurate around N*.
The real optimal value of K should be around these values (K∗). Consequently,
we calculated a range of K around K∗ by the exact queueing network model to
show how the true value of Kopt can vary from K∗. Figure 17 compares the cost
around K∗ in case of 1000 clients with c2 = 0.1 and 10 calculated by asymptotic
bounds and queueing network model. In the case of c2 = 10, Kopt is 10 which
is the same as asymptotic result but with a slightly different value of cost. In
the case of c2 = 0.1, 15 KDCs gives the minimal cost with value 11.144 which
is slightly smaller then case of K = 14 and 16 with value 11.184 and 11.178,
respectively. The cost at K∗ is calculated by asymptotic bounds which is clearly
close to the optimal value. As such we propose that the asymptotic bound, whilst
not giving the exact optimal solution in every case, can be use to calculate a
near optimal cost extremely efficiently.
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Figure 18 shows the cost varied with the rate of key being used calculated
by asymptotic bounds which answered the proposed third question. In this ex-
periment, number of servers and clients have been fixed. Generally, large ru
results more cost which caused by more frequently refresh the key, more work-
load has been added in KDC servers, consequently, more waiting jobs. According
to Stallings [6]: although cost increased, the system becomes more secure as the
eavesdropper has less cipher text to crack any given session key. As a security
manager must try to make a balance between security and performance. Ap-
parently, the balance point here is the value of ru for cost starting to increase
rapidly. It is not difficult to find ru = 0.01 is the anticipated answer for all
three cases(c2 = 0.1, 1 and 10). This is not a optimum selection, therefore, the
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accurate results are not quite necessary by a complex calculation. In practi-
cal circumstance, the security manager could choose a value for ru around 0.01
depending on different case.
11 Conclusion and Further Work
In this paper we have shown how a key distribution centre can be modelled
and analysed using the Markovian process algebra PEPA. The intuitive means
of modelling the protocol is cumbersome and suffers from state space explosion,
preventing meaningful analysis with significant numbers of clients.We have taken
three main approaches to coping with this problem; first we have implemented
a simulation of the model, secondly we have attempted to approximate the sys-
tem behaviour with a much simpler model, and finally ODE analysis has been
applied as a deterministic fluid flow analysis. The approximation shows good
accuracy of prediction compared with simulation, scales exceptionally well and
is fast to compute. ODE results have been compared with those derived from the
approximation. This approach as two main limitations. Firstly, it is not always
as accurate as the queueing approximation and secondly, we have not been able
to obtain all our desired metrics. However, the ODE approach does not suffer
the same numerical problems as the queueing approximation, is extremely effi-
cient to solve and is shown to be extremely accurate when the number of clients
is large. By using the asymptotic results, it is possible to compute the metrics
of interest extremely efficiently. Those techniques has been applied to a cost
model to explore the capacity planning for a system associated with this pro-
tocol. Three proposed questions have been answered through numerical results
which has been acquired by a very efficient approach of techniques combination.
This work is part of an on going investigation into performance modelling of
secure systems. The next step is to apply these modelling techniques to a class
of non-repudiation protocols.
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